In the United States, federal funding for public transit often accounts for a large proportion of a local agency's budget, especially for capital investments. For this reason, local governments can be expected to plan a portfolio of projects that maximize federal contributions. This study examines the financial effects of federal transit subsidy policy on local transit investment decisions. Data from a System Planning Study for the Geary Corridor in San Francisco are used as an illustration. It is found that federal transit subsidy policy provides financial incentives for local decision-makers to select capital-intensive investment options that may not be efficient or effective. While federal financial incentives are not the only factor influencing local investment decisions, some reform of the current subsidy policy may be necessary to reduce the incentive for ineffective use of public resources. 
Introduction
Since the 1960s, the U.S. government has provided financial support for public transit and stipulated conditions governing the allocation of subsidies from other levels of government.
Along with many other contributing factors, federal subsidy policies have played an important role in shaping local transit investment decisions even as federal subsidies have gradually decreased as a proportion of public support for transit projects. How does federal transit subsidy policy influence new transit service investment decisions by local governments? This question has been raised frequently but rarely has it been addressed empirically.
Over the past two decades, research on federal transit subsidy policies has largely focused on the effects of policy on transit cost and productivity.
1 Some researchers (e.g. Barnum and Gleason, 1979) found that a higher level of subsidy is associated with a higher level of effectiveness and that subsidies helped reverse declines in transit service and ridership. Most, however, have concluded that federal subsidy policy has encouraged service expansion and lower fares while inducing higher operating costs and lower labor productivity Cervero, 1984a Cervero, , 1984b Pickrell, 1986; Wachs, 1989; Li, 1992; Moore, 1993; Obeng, et al., 1995) . Some studies further suggest that federal transit subsidy policy, which has a long history of favoring capital over operating subsidies, may have induced early retirement of bus fleets and encouraged investments in capital intensive but inefficient transit services (Hilton, 1974; Gomez-Ibanez, 1985; Frankena, 1987; Wachs, 1989; Cromwell, 1989; Kain, 1988 Kain, , 1990 Pickrell, 1992; Obeng and Azam, 1995) . However, little 1 research has empirically documented how federal subsidy policy affects local investment decisions on new transit services and whether it leads to the selection of inefficient and ineffective alternatives for new transit services. Research on these questions is timely as the "reauthorization" of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-21), which was passed in 1998, is being considered now.
This paper explores the possible effects of federal transit subsidy policy on local transit investment decisions. We argue that several factors, including the need to balance political interests, the financial constraints of local governments, the division of financial responsibilities among governments at various levels, and the distinctive characteristics of the American political system, have motivated local decision-makers to weigh heavily the financial incentives provided by federal transit subsidy policy. Because federal transit subsidy policy favors capital over operating subsidies, it may encourage a preference for capital-intensive transit investments.
However, a capital-intensive transit investment may not be the most efficient and effective option.
In the following sections, we first discuss the importance of federal subsidies in local investment decision-making. Following the discussion, we illustrate the potential effects of federal transit subsidy policy using data from the Geary Corridor System Planning Study (GCSPS) in San Francisco. The final section summarizes findings and their implications.
While limited, a case study is appropriate given the absence of systematic data on local transit investment decisions in the U.S. and variations in policy effects due to different locational factors. The case study can provide some evidence on the possible effects of federal transit subsidy policy and shed light on the mechanisms through which federal subsidy policy influences local transit investment decisions.
The importance of federal financial subsidies in local decision-making
Federal policies can influence local transit investment decisions by providing financial incentives or disincentives for transit investments since financial considerations are important when making local transit investment decisions. The importance of federal financial factors in local decision-making can be examined by analyzing the nature of transportation decision-making in the U.S. and the distinct structure of federal transit subsidy programs.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that the transportation planning and decision-making process in the U.S. is pluralistic, resource allocative, consensus-seeking, problem-simplifying, and uncertainty-avoiding (Meyer and Miller, 1984) . In the case of transit investment decisions, the goals of proposed investments and alternatives are identified through a planning process in which policymakers, planners, and stakeholders interact, and the final investment decision is made on the basis of consensus among the parties involved in the process.
Such a transit investment decision-making process is inherently political and extremely complicated. It involves many stakeholders with dramatically different visions and conflicting interests. The selection of alternatives to be considered, the assumptions and analytical methods to be used in the evaluations, the criteria chosen for comparisons of transit investment options, and the final investment decisions are all reflections of political power and products of complex political interactions aiming to achieve consensus among diverse interest groups (Wachs, 1995) .
Because of the nature of such a decision-making process, politics plays a key role in shaping transit investment decisions. Several political factors create pressures and motivate local government decision-makers to make financial considerations an important criterion in making transit investment decisions. Such factors include the needs for balancing the interests of different groups and political constituencies and for accomplishing policy goals, the division of financial responsibility between the federal and local governments, local financial constraints, and political motivations. connecting to the rail line, people in the southern areas tended to favor bus services connecting to park-and-ride facilities near highways, and others preferred bus services connecting neighborhoods with major activity centers in Arlington (Cole & Li, 2001 ).
The Needs for Balancing Political Interests and Fulfilling Federal Requirements
In addition to preferences and needs, there are different priorities among different community groups. Transit must compete with other public services for limited city budgets, including street repair and maintenance, police, schools, museums, parks, etc. For example, in the case of a tax election in the City of Arlington, transit supporters perceived transit services as an urgent need for the city, while opponents considered street repair a more urgent priority (Rushing, 2002 
Division of Financial Responsibility
The division of financial responsibility between the federal and local governments and the difficulty of local governments in raising money for transit services also make external [ Figure 1 about here]
The declining importance of federal subsidies in transit operation is shown in Table 1 . Over the years, the level of available resources for local transit operations from the federal government has been shrinking, making transit operation ever more dependent upon state and local subsidies.
[ on the basis of claims that the measure did not comply with Proposition 13, which requires twothirds of the voters to support a special-purpose tax increase (Hager and Stein, 1992) . Los
Angeles County voters also passed a measure in 1998 to bar the use of local sales tax revenues to expand the local subway program (Center for Transportation Excellence, 1998) . These examples all demonstrate that financial constraints frequently dominate transit investment decisions. The problems of financial constraints and equitable allocation of resources exert strong pressures on local decision-makers to seek external financial resources.
Political Motivations
The American political system also motivates local decision makers to make financial considerations a central criterion. The federal resources brought into local jurisdictions and miles of track built are often used as performance measures by politicians seeking election or by the media evaluating candidates. For example, in responding to the question: "how would you pay for new mass transit expansion projects" by radio station WAMU 3 , Terry Lierman, a candidate running for the 8 th Congressional District seat in Maryland in the 2000 Election responded that he would "take the lead to ensure that Montgomery County's traffic problems get the attention in the transportation appropriation bill and funding that is long over due" (WAMU, 2000) . Similarly, in a newspaper article discussing his nomination for the position of U.S.
Secretary of Transportation by President Bush in January 2001, Norman Mineta was credited
with helping win federal funding for Santa Clara County's light-rail system and other projects (Cabanatuan, 2001) . Because of the nature of political competition, the desire to maximize financial support from the federal government is rational and not unique to transportation.
3 WAMU is a public radio station for National Public Radio (NPR) news and information in the greater Washington D.C. area.
In summary, balancing various interests, local financial constraints, the division of financial responsibility among several levels of government, and other aspects of the American political system put pressure on local decision-makers to maximize the receipt of external funds through the decision-making process. Because of financial need, political goals, and the availability of significant external funding from the federal government, the incentive or disincentive provided by federal transit subsidy policy could have significant influence in shaping local investment decisions.
Case study of the Effects of Federal Transit Subsidy Policy
To what extent does federal transit subsidy under TEA-21 influence local decisionmakers to choose one transit alternative over another? How do our hypothesized factors play out in reality? Would federal transit policy prompt the selection of less efficient and effective alternatives? The remainder of the paper explores these questions using the Geary Corridor as an example. The Geary Corridor is used because it is both unique and representative. On the one hand, it is one of the most heavily used transit corridors in the U.S. On the other hand, because the GCSPS consists of many common components of a typical planning process such as the involvement of stakeholders and the public in setting goals and scoring alternatives, this corridor is also quite representative of the corridor planning process.
In the following, we first describe the GCSPS, analyze political interests involved in the process of forming project objectives, and explore financial constraints facing Muni and city political leaders at the time the study was conducted. We then present the major structure of transit programs under TEA-21 and illustrate the financial responsibilities of the federal and local governments given the provisions of TEA-21. Finally we compare the efficiency and effectiveness of transit investment options to assess the effects of TEA-21 on local investment decision-making.
The Geary Corridor System Planning Study
The GCSPS was completed by Merrill Proposals to raise the sales tax, impose vehicle license and registration surcharges, increase Bay
Bridge tolls, impose a county or regional gas tax, or dedicate funds that the airport might owe the city also faced certain opposition from the affected communities (Dietz, 1995) . With such financial constraints, it was not surprising that city decision-makers sought external funds to support their various proposals. Alternative 4 was a light rail system in which trains travel on a surface median between 39th
Avenue and Gough Street, and in mixed flow or semi-exclusive lanes on the rest of the line. All six non-TSM alternatives also included improvements that were part of the TSM alternative.
The system planning study recommended advancing all alternatives but one, 3A, into the can be up to 80 percent. Funds are allocated on a discretionary basis except for fixed guideway modernization activities, for which funds are allocated by a statutory formula to urbanized areas with rail systems that have been in operation for at least seven years. Although there is a fixed amount apportioned to the capital investment program each year, there is no limit to the number of projects that a state or local government can apply for, or to the maximum amount that a project can request.
One feature of TEA-21 is that the competition for funding under this program is extremely political, as most of the money is designated by Congress for specific projects.
Therefore, in order to be competitive, applicants must have the support of congressional delegates from their local jurisdictions. Without such support, it is almost impossible to get funding under this program, even when a community has successfully completed the required steps in the major capital investment planning and project development process and been recommended by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to the Congress. This funding allocation process and the distinctive structure of the federal funding policy both open up opportunities for and encourage local governments to compete for federal assistance for new transit investments.
Financial Shares Under TEA-21
Based on the provisions of TEA-21, we analyze the financial responsibilities of governments for the six alternatives to explore whether the federal transit subsidy policies do provide financial incentives for local governments to invest in more expensive alternatives. To do so, we estimated the annual operating costs of the alternatives, annualized their capital costs, and applied the federal subsidy policies to derive the financial shares of the federal and local governments.
To estimate the annual operating costs of the alternatives, we developed three cost estimation models using a cost allocation method and operating cost and service statistics obtained from Muni's data in the National Transit Database Reporting System (Muni, 1994) .
The cost allocation model is widely used in transit planning practice. The key assumption of the model is that each operating cost item can be assigned or allocated to a specific operating statistic. The basic form of the model is that the cost of a route or a service equals the sum of a few unit costs of service statistics times the corresponding quantities of those statistics, such as vehicle miles or hours, or peak vehicles. This can be expressed in equation (1) To derive the unit costs of service data, we first assigned the operating cost items reported in the database to relevant service measures for each mode, summed up the costs in each category, and divided the costs by the service measurements. That is:
where:
TC i = the total operating cost associated with service characteristic i; j = a particular class of function and expense object, such as labor for vehicle maintenance, or materials and supplies for vehicle maintenance, etc.;
C j = cost of j, such as cost of labor for vehicle maintenance, or cost of materials and supplies for vehicle maintenance, etc. These costs are associated with a service characteristic i, which is revenue vehicle miles or hours in this particular example. n = number of class of functions and expense objects associated with a particular service characteristic i.
By using the cost allocation method and Muni's data, three models were developed: Table 2 shows estimates of service input, output, and consumption for each alternative by the GCSPS. In addition, the GCSPS also provides design components such as rail stations and route miles for each alternative. Based the GCSPS data, we were able to derive the annual operating costs of the alternatives.
[ Table 2 About Here]
The annual capital cost estimates of the alternatives were calculated based on the detailed capital components of each alternative, and their costs and economic lives provided by the GCSPS. 7 A 7 percent discount rate was used in the calculation. The annual capital cost estimates were also adjusted to FY 1994 constant dollars.
In addition, we assumed that the preventive maintenance costs for motor bus, trolley bus, and light rail would be 28, 25, and 42 percent of their annual operating costs, respectively.
These percentages were derived from Muni's 1994 National Transportation Database Report.
The 1994 Report also indicates that the state subsidy accounted for about 10 percent of the total 7 See Tables 5A ~ 5G in GCSPS.
operating revenue. Since the state's contribution is relatively small, we included the state subsidy with local costs in order to focus on the effects of federal subsidy policy.
Based on these estimates, we calculated the financial shares of the federal and local governments for each alternative. As described before, the maximum federal share of cost is 80 percent of a project's capital and preventive maintenance costs. The rest is the responsibilities of state and local governments. The results are shown in Table 3 alternatives also require the highest amount of state and local matches among all the options, the increase in such matches (that is the difference in local matches between the surface/subway light rail alternatives and other options) is far less than the increase in federal subsidy. In addition, the increase in state and local matches required for capital intensive-investments is often justified by local economic benefits such as jobs created by rail capital investment and other multiplier effects of large transit investment. This makes the surface/subway light rail alternatives more attractive than other options.
[ Table 3 About Here]
Performance Comparison of Transit Alternatives
How good would the surface/subway light rail alternatives be as compared to other options? Would they still be the preferred choices of Muni in the absence of federal financial incentives? To answer this question, it is necessary to compare the efficiency and effectiveness of the alternatives and evaluate them based on the objectives of transit investment. The efficiency and effectiveness of the alternatives can be compared using inter-modal performance indicators.
Inter-modal performance indicators are a set of standardized indicators that measure the efficiency and effectiveness of all transit modes (Lem, Li, and Wachs, 1994) . Inter-modal performance indicators incorporate the principles of life cycle costing and the variation of vehicle capacity among transit modes. With inter-modal performance indicators, service input is measured by total costs including capital and operating costs. Service output is measured by revenue vehicle capacity miles and hours, which is equal to the products of revenue vehicle miles or hours and the vehicle capacities (seats and standees) of the transit modes. Service consumption is measured both by unlinked passenger trips and passenger miles. Each performance indicator is calculated as a ratio between two measures of service input, output, or consumption.
In this study, seating capacities were assumed to be 56 for an articulated bus or a trolley bus, and 68 for a rail car. Total capacity of vehicles was assumed to be 150 percent of the seating capacities for bus and trolley, and 300 percent of the seating capacity for rail. Based on the characteristics of service design and estimated patronage provided by the GCSPS, as well as these vehicle capacity assumptions, we calculated annual service outputs, which incorporate the variations of vehicle capacities of different modes, and service consumptions of the proposed alternatives in addition to the annual capital and operating cost estimates described in the above section. Furthermore, we incorporated time savings of the alternatives provided by the GCSPS into the calculations of performance indicators. Specifically, total annual costs of the alternatives were adjusted by their values of time savings. The results imply that in the absence of federal financial incentives, the surface/subway light rail alternatives may not be the preferred choices of Muni, if a decision is made rationally on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness criteria. In terms of cost efficiency, the TSM alternative would be the first choice, followed by the all surface light rail option #4. If the investment objective were to be to maximize service effectiveness and attract new passengers at the least cost, the trolley bus alternatives would be Muni's preferred choices. However, if a decision were made on the basis of maximizing the federal financial gain, Alternatives 2B and 2A would be the first and second choices.
Discussion
Numerous studies have found optimistic ridership forecasts and underestimated costs in many light rail projects. For instance, Pickrell (1992) compared actual transit patronage and costs with the forecasted figures for rail transit projects built in Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Miami, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Portland, and Sacramento. He reported that in almost all these cases, transit ridership was overestimated and the cost was underestimated. The actual total cost per passenger was twice to five times the forecast value. Similar conclusions are also found in studies of rail projects in Los Angeles and Dallas (Kain, 1988 (Kain, , 1990 Moore, 1993; Rubin & Moore, 1996) . Some researchers further suggested that federal capital subsidies are part of the explanation for unbounded enthusiasm for rail systems. In some cases, decisions to build rail dictated the results of technical analyses of transit investment alternatives and voters were misled about costs and performance of alternative systems. (Kain, 1988; Richmond, 1998) .
In this study, we did not attempt to judge whether the GCSPS miscalculated the costs and ridership of the alternatives, which is beyond the scope of our study. Instead our analyses are largely based on the data of the GCSPS. However, the results of the foregoing analyses do
show that the more capital-intensive surface/subway light rail options envisioned in the document "A Vision for Rapid Transit in San Francisco" tend to be less efficient and effective, but would generate more federal financial support than other less capital-intensive options under the current transit subsidy policies. The findings seem to suggest that the federal subsidy policy would provide an incentive for capital-intensive investments in the Geary Corridor.
Conclusion
While previous studies suggest that federal transit subsidy policy might have induced costly early retirement of capital assets and encouraged expensive transit investments, little prior research has demonstrated how federal subsidy policy affects local transit investment decisions.
This study attempts to explain the possible effects of federal subsidy policy on local transit investment decisions, and illustrates these effects using the data from the San Francisco GCSPS.
We argue that due to financial and political constraints, local decision-makers have to include financial considerations among the important criteria in making transit investment decisions. Because federal financial support is a significant external source for local transit investments, federal transit subsidy can shape local transit investment decisions. While federal financial incentives may not completely determine local transit investment decisions, they are a catalyst for capital-intensive investments. When combined with other motivations, federal financial incentives could lead to inefficient investment decisions. Our illustration shows that based on the data from the GCSPS, more capital-intensive investment alternatives tend to generate larger financial support from the federal government. However, they may not be the most efficient and effective options. The finding implies that federal subsidy policy does provide financial incentives for local governments to invest in more capital-intensive modes.
Decisions made on the basis of maximizing federal financial support or minimizing local financial burden may lead to the selection of inefficient and ineffective alternatives.
The relationship between federal policy and local decisions is very complex. The actual effect of federal policy on local decisions depends on local political conditions and structure, as well as special circumstances under which transit investment decisions are made. Although the findings from this case study cannot be generalized to other locations and a more solid conclusion on the issue would have to be reached as more case studies become available, the study does empirically address the question of how federal transit subsidy policy may influence local transit investment decisions and shed light on the issue.
In the past, policy debate has focused on the division of operating and capital funds or eliminating operating funds. In the future, transit subsidy policy debates should focus not only on elevating the requirement of local matches for capital projects, but also on offering rewards to transit operators that provide high-quality transit services to passengers at low costs. In addition, the current funding allocation approach may need reform. With a large proportion of funding earmarked by Congress, the political nature of funding allocation can discourage serious comparison of transit investment alternatives. Without reform, it would also be difficult to implement the Federal Transit Administration's rules for major capital project evaluation and the rating processes, as outlined in federal law (U.S. DOT, 2000b) . A more radical alternative to the current funding allocation approach would be to return a larger proportion of the locally generated money to state and local governments. While this approach may not guarantee that public resources are spent efficiently, it would at least reduce the incentive for inefficient use of public resources, and limit the federal government's involvement in local investment decisions, while maintaining the federal government's role in balancing the needs of areas having limited local funding resources. Notes: P = Preliminary data.
(a) Includes fares retained by contractors; beginning 1991 includes fare subsidies formerly included in "other".
(b) "Local" includes taxes levied directly by transit agency and other subsidies from local government such as bridge and tunnel tolls and non-transit parking lot funds. Beginning 1994, such funds reclassified from "local" to "other". Note: TSM = Transportation System Management; LR = light rail; TB = trolley bus; DMB = dual bus mode; long = long segment in tunnel; short = short segment in tunnel; surface = entire alignment at grade. Source: Table D-3, Table D-4, Tables 3 -4, Tables 5A-5G 
